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ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE BEFORE
FEDERAL AGENCIES
William H. Sager* and Leslie S. Shapiro**
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
AND STATE PRACTICE
T HERE exist more than forty federal executive and administrative
agencies before which lawyers (and in many cases, laymen) may
practice and serve the interests of clients. The complexities of our so-
ciety, the specializations which are a by-product of a complex industrial
state, and the persistent growth of government's bureaucracy, point up
the continuing importance of practice before federal administrative
agencies.
Over fifty years ago, Mr. Elihu Root, then president of the American
Bar Association, stated:
There is one special field of law development which has manifestly
become inevitable. We are entering upon the creation of a body of
administrative law quite different in its machinery, its remedies, and
its necessary safeguards from the old methods of regulation by specific
statutes enforced by the courts. . . . We shall go on; we shall expand
them, whether we approve theoretically or not, because such agencies
furnish protection to rights and obstacles to wrongdoing which under
our new social and industrial conditions cannot be practically accomp-
lished by the old and simple procedure of legislatures and courts as in
the last generation.1
It has been observed that the average citizen is much more directly and
frequently affected by the administrative process than by the judicial
process. In fact, the number of federal agency cases disposed of, in-
volving an oral hearing with a verbatim transcript and the determina-
*Director of Practice, U. S. Department of the Treasury. B.A., Virginia, 1941; LL.B.,
1948; MA., 1949.
**Attorney-advisor, Office of Director of Practice, U.S. Department of the Treasurv.
B.S., Minnesota, 1957; J.D., 1959.
1 E. Root, Public Service by the Bar, 41 A.B.A. REP. 355, 368-69 (1916).
21 K. DAVIS, ADmNIsmnra LAw TREATISE § 1.02 (1958, Supp. 1965).
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tion of private rights, privileges, or obligations, and excluding determina-
tions solely on written applications or oral presentations in the nature
of conference or interview, exceeded 81,000 cases in a single year.3 How-
ever, the representation of clients' interests before agencies of the fed-
eral government is not a concept which has emanated solely from the
recent expansion of administrative law. Review of two important areas
of agency practice discloses that the recognition of practitioners before
the Treasury Department dates back to 1884,4 and that of the Patent
Office to 1861.1
In passing, it might be noted that a state may not place restrictions on
federal administrative practice, even though it is well established that
states have a substantial and legitimate interest in. regulating the prac-
tice of law within their borders. Sperry v. Florida cleared away any
doubt as to the invalidity of state regulation of practitioners before a
federal administrative agency in proper exercise of its legislative man-
date. Relying upon the supremacy clause of the Constitution and the
doctrine of Gibbons v. Ogden,7 the United States Supreme Court held in
Sperry that the state may not exercise powers, otherwise permissible,
where such exercise is incompatible with federal legislation. Thus, activi-
ties relating to federal administrative practice are clearly preempted by
the federal government.
The question of who may practice before a federal administrative
agency, qualifications, admission requirements, licensing procedures and
disciplinary proceedings against those admitted to practice, are questions
of import to the legal community, lay practitioners and, of course, to
clients and claimants. The purpose of this article is to review some of
these questions in the light of Public Law 89-332 s (also referred to as
3 Id. (The year referred to is 1963).
4 Act of July 7, 1884, 23 Stat. 258.
5 Act of March 2, 1861, 12 Stat. 247.
6 373 U.S. 379 (1963). Sperry, a layman, was registered to practice in patent matters
before the United States Patent Office. The Florida Bar sought to enjoin him from hold-
ing himself out as a patent attorney, alleging, among other things, that he was engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law. The United States Supreme Court vacated the injunc-
tion ordered by the Supreme Court of Florida, concluding that Sperry's practice before
the Patent Office was outside the scope of the state's regulatory power.
7 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
8 79 Stat. 1281, amending 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1964). The full text of the Act reads as fol-
lows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That-
(a) Any person who is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest
court of any State, possession, territory, Commonwealth, or the District of Colum-
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the Agency Practice Act); to present some of the background and the
history of that legislation during its consideration by the Congress, and
particularly its effect on practice before the Internal Revenue Service of
the Treasury Department, before which more attorneys practice than
any other agency of the federal government.
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 89-3 32, THE AGENCY PRACTICE ACT
Public Law 89-332 was signed into law by President Johnson on
November 8, 1965. Basically, it eliminated agency-established admission
requirements and bars for licensed attorneys who appear before federal
administrative agencies (with the exception of the Patent Office in patent
matters). In addition, certified public accountants were admitted to
practice before the Internal Revenue Service without admission require-
bia may represent others before any agency upon filing with the agency a written
declaration that he is currently qualified as provided by this subsection and is
authorized to represent the particular party in whose behalf he acts.
(b) Any person who is duly qualified to practice as a certified public accountant
in any State, possession, territory, Commonwealth, or the District of Columbia may
represent others before the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury Department
upon filing with that agency a written declaration that he is currently qualified as
provided by this subsection and is authorized to represent the particular party in
whose behalf he acts.
(c) Nothing herein shall be construed i) to grant or deny to any person who
is not qualified as provided by subsection (a) or (b) the right to appear for or
represent others before any agency or in any agency proceeding; (ii) to authorize
or limit the discipline, including disbarment, of persons who appear in a representa-
tive capacity before any agency; (iii) to authorize any person who is a former
officer or employee of an agency to represent others before an agency where
such representation is prohibited by statute or regulation; or (iv) to prevent an
agency from requiring a power of attorney as a condition to the settlement of an-
controversy involving the payment of money.
(d) This section shall not be applicable to practice before the Patent Office
with respect to patent matters which shall continue to be covered by chapter 3
(sections 31 to 33) of title 35 of the United States Code.
Smc. 2. When any participant in any matter before an agency is represented by
a person qualified pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of section 1, any notice or
other written communication required or permitted to be given to such partici-
pant in such matter shall be given to such representative in addition to any other
service specifically required by statute. If a participant is represented by more
than one such qualified representative, service upon any one of such representatives
shall be sufficient.
SEC. 3. As used in this Act, "agency" shall have the same meaning as it does in
section 2(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, as amended (60 Stat. 237, as
amended.)
Approved November 8, 1965.
Later certain clarifications in the wording were made by the Act of Sept. 11,
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-83, 81 Star. 195, amending 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1964).
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ments.9 The legislation is implemented by practical procedures which
safeguard the agencies and the public alike.'0
Prior to the enactment of the Agency Practice Act, four federal agen-
cies-Veterans Administration, Interstate Commerce Commission,
Patent Office in patent matters, and the Internal Revenue Service-re-
quired formal admission procedures or special examinations as a condi-
tion precedent to an attorney's practicing before them. These agencies,
as well as other agencies, also exercised disciplinary authority, such as
suspension or disbarment from practice, where attorneys engaged in
misconduct before them." A number of other agencies, which previ-
ously had admission requirements, eliminated them pursuant to a recom-
mendation in 1957 of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of
Justice.1 Hence, the several agencies which maintained admission re-
quirements at the time of the enactment of the Agency Practice Act,
maintained their respective bars of attorneys (and in some instances,
e.g., Treasury Department, Patent Office and Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, also of non-attorneys) eligible to practice before each such
agency.
The principal purpose of the Agency Practice Act was to provide, as
far as practicable, for the right of persons to be represented before fed-
eral agencies by any attorney in good standing. The bill, which intro-
duced the legislation in the 89th Congress and which was eventually
enacted in November 1965, was known as S. 1758. Similar bills having
the purpose of abolishing administrative admission requirements had
been introduced in Congress during several sessions preceding the 89th
Congress. The immediate forerunner of S. 1758 was S. 1466, intro-
duced in the 88th Congress. This measure passed the Senate, but ad-
journment of Congress prevented full consideration and the measure
died.
The principal proponent of S. 1758 (and the predecessor bills) was
the Sub-Committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The policies prompting the intro-
duction of the bill developed because of a long history of dissatisfaction
by attorneys when faced with the onerous task of making applications
9 H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 1141].
10 S. REP. No. 755, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
7551.
11 Hearings on S. 1466 Before the Subconmv. on Admin. Practice and Procedures of the
Senate Comz. on the judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 1466].
12 Id. at 1.
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to federal agencies for admission, and particularly when meeting re-
quirements of admission was seemingly meaningless.' 3 Therefore, the
Senate Sub-Committee concluded that passage of the bill would closely
align procedures before federal administrative agencies with those which
are effectively used in state and federal courts throughout the country
today. 4
Review of the transcript of the hearings held on S. 1758 (and also its
predecessor S. 1466) discloses that the bill was given the overwhelming
support of attorneys, bar associations and persons who are experts on the
administrative process. Mr. Richard H. Keating, Chairman of the
American Bar Association, Committee on the Administrative Practice
Act (Administrative Law Section) set forth the following basic position
of the American Bar Association:
The American Bar Association's position is based upon a fundamental
principle; namely, that an attorney who has been found qualified to
represent others before the highest court in his jurisdiction, and who
is subject to the restraints and disciplines of the legal profession, should
by that fact be accepted as qualified to represent others before the
various Federal agencies. That is the essence of our position. It has
wide support among the rank and file of the members of the bar
throughout the country.15
The Virginia Bar was overwhelmingly in support of the legislation.
Mr. Waldo G. Miles, on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Vir-
ginia State Bar Association, stated that the Association was unanimously
in favor of the legislation.' Further, the Virginia State Bar submitted
to the Senate Judiciary Committee the following resolution:
After careful consideration the executive committee of the Virginia
State Bar, acting on behalf of the council and members of the Virginia
State Bar, heartily endorses and approves the enactment of Senate bill
S. 1466 now pending in the 88th Congress and directs Hon. R. E.
Booker, secretary-treasurer, to transmit this resolution to the Senate
subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, with copies
13 Id.
14 S. REP. No. 755 at 7.
15 Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and S. 1079 Before the Subconn. on Admin.
Practice and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 116,
117 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 17581.
16 Hearings on S. 1466 at 203.
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to the members of the Senate and House of Representatives from Vir-
ginia.17
Thus, the lawyers of the Commonwealth of Virginia, as well as those of
numerous other states, supported by their respective bar associations,
sanctioned the passage of the bill to the extent of formalizing their en-
dorsement by resolution.
A. Opposition to the Original Bill (S. 1466) by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants
The principal area of opposition outside the federal government to
the proposed legislation was by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants. This association comprises a national organization
of certified public accountants in the United States with membership
in 1965 of over 53,000.18 Its objectives include the maintenance and en-
hancement of the professional standards of the accounting profession to
the end that members of the profession may render an effective service
to the public in the accounting field.1" The opposition by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants was directed at Section 1 of
S. 1466 o (the predecessor of S. 1758). The Institute's opposition was
based on the principles set forth by the Supreme Court that each agency,
by its own evaluation, should determine what protection is necessary in
recognizing practitioners in light of its own particular needs for efficient
functioning and in light of adequate protection of the public. 1 The
Institute felt the matter was of special importance with respect to prac-
tice before the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury Department.
The Institute's statement pointed out that the Treasury Department
traditionally has recognized the qualifications and competency of certi-
fied public accountants and has granted them the privilege of enrollment
17 Id.
18 Hearings on S. 1758 at 70.
19 Hearings on S. 1466 at 226, 227.
2 0 See Act of Nov. 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-332, § 1, 79 Stat. 1281, amending 5 U.S.C. §
500 (1964); Act of Sept. 11, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-83, 81 Stat. 195, amending 5 U.S.C.
§ 500 (1964).
21 Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). See also Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals,
270 U.S. 117 (1925). This was a mandamus proceeding by an attorney and certified pub-
lic accountant from a denial of his application to practice before the Board of Tax Ap-
peals. The chief isues was whether the Board of Tax Appeals had power to adopt rules
of practice by which it might limit those who practiced before it to persons whom
the Board deemed qualified to perform such service and to be of proper character.
The Supreme Court held that the Board was so authorized to make rules as to persons
who might practice before it.
1969]
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to practice before the Department upon a showing that they hold a
license to practice under state law, are in good standing, and are not
subject to any special disqualification.22 Hence, the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants concluded that the enactment of S. 1466
would not be in the public interest.23 The Institute voiced similar ob-
jections in connection with S. 1758.24 The Senate Committee on the
Judiciary considered the interests and arguments of the American In-
stitute of Certified Public Accountants and amended S. 1758 to include
duly qualified certified public accountants in the case of representation
solely before the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury Depart-
ment. 5
B. Patent Office Opposition to the Legislation
Only two federal agencies raised objections to S. 1758 or the prede-
cessor bill S. 1466, the Patent Office and the Treasury Department. 6
The Patent Office took the position in its objection that practice before
it is so specialized that only persons who have particular types of training
should be permitted to practice in patent matters. The thrust of the ob-
jection of the Patent Office was that the uniqueness of the practice
before the Patent Office represented a special case requiring an exemption
from the provision of the bill.27 Hence, the Patent Office wished to
retain the statutory sanction for its imposition of admission require-
ments.28 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, believing that patent
cases could continue to be handled by technically competent attorneys,
concluded initially that the exemption requested by the Patent Office
was not warranted. 9 However, the House Committee on the Judiciary
found merit in the contention of the Patent Office and recommended
the operations of the Patent Office with respect to patent matters should
be exempted from the provisions of Section 1 of S. 1758.30 The Senate
eventually receded and the legislation, as enacted into Public Law 89-
332, thus exempted the Patent Office from its purview.
22 Hearings on S. 1466 at 226, 227; TREas. DEPr. Circular No. 230, 5 10.3(d) (Aug.
1964); 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(b) (1969).
23 Hearings on S. 1466 at 226, 227.
24 See statement by John F. Sonnet, attorney representing the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Hearings on S. 1758 at 69.
25 S. REP. No. 755 at 2.
26 Id. at 4.
2 7 Id. at 5.
28 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1964).
20 S. REP. No. 755 at 5, 6.
30 H. R. REP. No. 1141 at 4.
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C. Treasury Department Opposition to the Legislation
The position of the Treasury Department before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary was that it also should be exempt from the pur-
view of the Agency Practice Act. Under Treasury Department regu-
lations governing eligibility for enrollment to practice before the
Internal Revenue Service, an attorney was required to satisfy require-
ments of good character and reputation.-1 In this connection, an applica-
tion3 2 was filed by each prospective practitioner together with an
application fee of $25.00. An evaluation of his application was made by
the Office of Director of Practice regarding the applicant's character
and reputation, including whether or not he had filed required federal
income tax returns for each of the three years preceding the year of his
application. The Treasury Department set forth the rationale that it
did not believe that state bar associations adequately policed the con-
duct of their members and, as a result, retained on their rolls attorneys
who might be persons of questionable character and reputation.3 3 More
attorneys are enrolled to practice before the Internal Revenue Service
than before any other agency of the federal government. This, of
course, is because more citizens and corporations are concerned with
their obligations as taxpayers to the Internal Revenue Service than are
concerned with affairs or matters before any other federal agency. The
Treasury Department, therefore, argued that it should be assured that
the numerous attorneys who appeared before it to represent clients on
tax matters were honest taxpayers themselves and persons of good tax
morality. 4 In brief, the Internal Revenue Service should not be corn-
31 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a) (1964), reprinted as Tanks. DEPT. Circular No. 230 (Aug. 1964).
32 TRAs. DEPT. Form 23.
33 S. REP. No. 755 at 4; Hearings on S. 1466 at 90, 91, in which Crane C. Hauser, Chief
Counsel, Internal Revenue Service stated:
"There is wide diversity among the States, both in character and fitness require-
ments for admission to the bar and in disciplinary procedures. As far as we know,
a conviction for the misdemeanor of failure to file tax returns is not grounds for
disbarment in any judisdiction, and there are even some jurisdictions where a con-
viction for the felony of tax evasion will not be considered a crime involving
moral turpitude which entails disbarment. Dean E. Blythe Stason, who is the ad-
ministrator of the American Bar Foundation, expresses some doubts as to the ef-
ficacy of State disciplinary procedures in an article in the March 1963, issue of
American Bar Association Journal .... I quote what he said there:
'With about 285,000 lawyers in the country, the number subjected to disci-
pline is remarkably small. One wonders how many there are who deserve
discipline but in fact escape.'
In addition to the lack of interest on the part of many bar associations in tax vio-
lations as grounds for disbarment, even those bar associations which might be so
interested do not have available to them the necessary information . "
34 Hearings on S. 1466 at 91.
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pelled to deal administratively with a dishonest attorney, even if he is
in good standing with his state bar association.
In addition to the Treasury Department's criticism of the state bar
associations' failure to adequately supervise their membership, the De-
partment argued further that the bars of the various states do not grant
comity or reciprocity to a member of the bar of a sister state without an
independent integrity check into the applicant's good character and
reputation. Why, then, should the attorney who seeks to represent a
client before a federal agency in an administrative practice involving
original federal jurisdiction, over which the state may exercise no
control, not be required to establish his good character and reputation
to the satisfaction of the agency?
It was conceded by the Treasury Department that attorneys as well
as certified public accountants were qualified professionally to repre-
sent taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service. Hence, there were
no further qualifications imposed on members of these professions with
respect to competence, skills, knowledge and ability."5
It should be noted that in 1958 the Hoover Commission recommended
that admission requirements to practice before federal administrative
agencies be abolished. 6 The Treasury Department's position at that
time was that it had no objection to such action if directed by legislation
to do so."' The Treasury Department's now reversed position questioned
the ethical standards of attorneys by insisting that the test of good
character and reputation should be continued as required by current
regulations. On the other hand, the Patent Office was concerned with
the technical training and educational background of practitioners.
Thus, the objections of the two agencies contradicted rather than sup-
ported each other."'
The House Committee on the Judiciary concluded that there is a
presumption that members in good standing in the profession of the law
(and certified public accountancy) are persons of good moral character,
and that surveillance by state bar associations will sufficiently insure the
integrity of practice by such persons before the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. Accordingly, the House Committee recommended the elimination
of the good character and reputation qualifications imposed by the
Treasury Department regulations upon attorneys who sought admission
35 H. R. REP. No. 1141 at 3.
36 S. R-. No. 755 at 4.
37d.
38 Id.
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to practice before the Internal Revenue Service. 9 The Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary also was of the similar opinion that surveillance by
state bar associations would insure the integrity of practice. Conse-
quently, this Committee concluded that the admission procedures were
a restriction on duly licensed attorneys in tax cases and, therefore, un-
warranted. The Senate Committee viewed the relationship between the
effectiveness of an advocate and that advocate's personal affairs and
personal tax problems as being remote. °
As can be seen, of the principal objections to the proposed legislation,
the positions set forth by the certified public accountants and the Patent
Office were accepted by the Congress. The objections of the Treasury
Department were overruled. Since the other two federal agencies who
had prior admission requirements raised no objection, practitioners most
affected by the legislation were those who practiced before the In-
ternal Revenue Service of the Treasury Department. On November 8,
1965, the date of the enactment of the Agency Practice Act, there were
approximately 86,000 attorneys and certified public accountants enrolled
to practice before the Internal Revenue Service.4 1
III. THE EFFECT OF THE AGENCY PRACTICE ACT ON PRACTICE BEFORE
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
Prior to the enactment of the Agency Practice Act, no person appear-
ing as an attorney or agent in behalf of a taxpayer before the Internal
Revenue Service would be recognized as such unless he was duly en-
rolled and in good standing to practice before the Internal Revenue
Service in accordance with regulations. Evidence of enrollment was
indicated by the possession of a so-called "treasury card" which was
issued to enrolled persons, in one form or another, after June 28, 1923.42
Moreover, evidence of enrollment (the "treasury card") was required
to be submitted upon request when a practitioner appeared before the
Internal Revenue Service for conference.4 3 Enactment of the Agency
Practice Act eliminated the necessity of enrollment by attorneys and
certified public accountants and provided that all attorneys and certified
s9 H.R. REP. No. 1141 at 4.
4o S. REP. No. 755 at 5.
41 1966 SEC'Y TREAs. ANN. REP. 94.
42TREAs. DEPr. Circular No. 326 (June 1923). Applications for enrollment were
required of attorneys since February 15, 1921. See the first publication of TREAs. DEr.
Circular No. 230 (1921).
43 26 C.F.R. § 601.502(b) (1954).
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public accountants who met the requirements of the Act were eligible
to practice before the Internal Revenue Service.
Interim regulations issued by the Treasury Department on Novem-
ber 16, 1965, directed the Internal Revenue Service to recognize any
attorney who filed a declaration as described in paragraph 1 (a) of the
Act, which would contain the following statements and information:
(a) a statement that the declarant is currently qualified as a member
in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any state,
possession, territory, Commonwealth, or the District of Columbia,
specifying in which of such jurisdictions he is so qualified;
(b) the declarant's full name, address and telephone number; and
(c) a statement that declarant is authorized to represent a particular
party and the name and address of that party.44
A similar statement was required of a certified public accountant.
Revisions of the rules governing the practice of attorneys, certified
public accountants and enrolled agents before the Internal Revenue
Service took effect on September 13, 1966, and formalized the effect
of the Agency Practice Act on practice before the Internal Revenue
Service.45 Under these revised rules any attorney who is not cur-
rently under suspension or disbarment from practice before the
Internal Revenue Service may practice before the Service, upon filing
with the Service the written declaration required by the Act.46 Other
revisions to the rules of practice before the Internal Revenue Service
necessitated by the enactment of the Agency Practice Act are discussed
in a subsequent part of this article.
It also became necessary to revise the Conference and Practice Re-
quirements promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 47
The Conference and Practice Requirements are published as a means of
implementing the formal regulations and policy of the Internal Revenue
Service regarding its discussions and conferences with taxpayers and their
representatives on matters of disputed tax liability. Accordingly, while
Treasury Department Circular No. 230 provides standards of conduct
for practice before the Internal Revenue Service, the Commissioner's
44 30 Fed. Reg. 14331 (1965).
4531 C.F.R. S 10 (1969); TREAs. D=1"r. Circular No. 230 (Sept. 1966).
4631 C.F.R. § 10.3(a) (1969); TREAs. DEP-r. Circular No. 230, § 10.3(a), (Sept. 1966).
The declaration form is INT. REv. Form 2848 (combined with power of attorney)
or Form 2848-D (combined with the tax information authorization).
47 26 C.F.R. § 601.501-27 (1969).
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Conference and Practice Requirements set forth the procedures for
practice.
Revisions to the Conference and Practice Requirements were published
on September 14, 1967.48 Under the revised procedures, an attorney is
recognized if (1) he meets the requirements set forth in Treasury De-
partment Circular No. 230 and files the required declaration, and (2)
furnishes evidence to the Internal Revenue Service that he is authorized
to perform certain acts on behalf of the taxpayer, or that he is authorized
to receive or inspect confidential tax information regarding the taxpayer.
A power of attorney is a continuing requirement under the Commis-
sioner's Conference and Practice Requirements and is required when the
taxpayer's representative desires to perform one or more of the following
acts:
(1) receive (but not for endorsement or for collection) a check in
payment of any Internal Revenue refund for taxes, penalties or
interest;
(2) execute a waiver of restriction on assessment or collection of a
deficiency in tax, or of a waiver of notice of disallowance of a
claim for credit or refund;
(3) execute a consent to extend the statutory period for assessment or
collection of a tax;
(4) execute a closing agreement under Section 7121 of the Internal
Revenue Code;
(5) substitute another representative.4 9
A new concept in the Commissioner's Conference and Practice Re-
quirements is the tax information authorization. This is a document
signed by the taxpayer authorizing his representative to receive or inspect
confidential tax information regarding a specified matter. Its purpose
is to protect the confidentiality of tax information which is required by
statute and to assure the Service employee that confidential tax informa-
tion is revealed only upon direction of the taxpayer to his authorized
representative. The tax information authorization is not necessary if the
representative files a power of attorney as discussed above, if the repre-
sentative attends a conference accompanied by the taxpayer, or if he
receives notices or other communications which do not involve the
disclosure of confidential tax information.50 However, there can be no
4s 32 Fed. Reg. 13058 (1967).
49 26 C.F.R. § 601.502(c) (1) (1969); INr. REv. Form 2848.
50 26 C.F.R. § 601.502(c) (3) (1969). The Agency Practice Act requires that the agency
communicate with the authorized representative. 79 Stat. 1281, § 2.
19691
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disclosure of confidential tax information unless the representative files a
power of attorney, or a tax information authorization, or is accompanied
by the taxpayer.
There are several matters regarding practice before federal adminis-
trative agencies which are not covered by the Agency Practice Act.
Among these are representation before agencies by laymen, self-repre-
sentation, conflict of interest, disciplinary procedures, and representa-
tion by former employees. More important, the Act specifically does not
authorize or limit discipline, including disbarment, of persons appearing
in a representative capacity before any agency."' Consequently, agencies
maintain authority to deal with these matters, and regulations in regard
thereto are in effect.
With respect to practice before the Internal Revenue Service of the
Treasury Department, enrollment still is required of non-attorneys and
non-certified public accountants who meet the qualifications for enroll-
ment set forth by regulations. 2 Rules of conduct also are maintained
and enforced by the Treasury Department governing practice by at-
torneys, certified public accountants and enrolled agents before the In-
ternal Revenue Service.5" Such regulations were revised, effective Sep-
tember 13, 1966, to meet the scope and intent of the Agency Practice
Act. The greatest change in the rules of conduct is that the rules now
refer almost exclusively to the conduct of practice before the Internal
Revenue Service, as opposed to the broad range of a practitioner's con-
duct generally. Hence, under the revised regulations, disciplinary pro-
ceedings are concerned primarily with violation of standards of conduct
which directly affect the rights of taxpayers to sound representation
before the Internal Revenue Service, or which relate to the ability of
the Service to carry out its functions. These revisions were made on
the theory that the professional licensing authorities and grievance com-
mittees of bar associations will now "police" their members' general pro-
fessional conduct and redress grievances of clients for misconduct no
longer covered by the regulations governing practice before the Serv-
ice. However, practitioners are still subject to disciplinary action (in-
cluding disbarment) for violation of the rules governing practice before
the federal agencies. For example, for the fiscal year ended June 30.
1968, the Office of Director of Practice of the Treasury Department
(which acts, in effect, as a "grievance committee" for the Commissioner
5179 Stat. 1281, § 1 (c) (ii).
52 31 C.F.R. § 10.4 (1969); TREAs. DEPT. Circular No. 230 § 10.4 (Sept. 1966).
53 31 C.F.R. § 10 (1969), reprinted as TREAs. DEPT. Circular No. 230 (Sept. 1966).
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of Internal Revenue) was instrumental in disciplinary action against
forty-four practitioners. Of these, eight were attorneys, twenty-three
were certified public accountants and the remainder were enrolled
agents. 4
IV. SUMMARY AND COMMENT
When the House of Representatives considered S. 1758 for enactment,
Representative Richard H. Poff (R., Va.), a member of the House Ju-
diciary Committee, summed up the purpose of the legislation in the
following manner:
Mr. Speaker, this is not a lawyer's bill. This is not a certified public
accountant's bill. This is not a Government agency bill. This is a
private citizen bill.
As the Federal Government grows bigger and bigger, as its laws get
more and more complex, and as it touches more and more the lives of
more and more citizens, it becomes more and more important that the
citizen's rights in any dispute he may have with his Government should
be accorded the first priority.
The first protection he must be assured is his right to select his own
representative to speak for him. That right he does not fully enjoy
today. Some governmental agencies have assumed a power never dele-
gated specifically by statute. They have undertaken to decide who is
qualified and who is not qualified to represent his fellow citizens in
proceedings before them....
This bill intends to return to the citizen to whom it belongs the
right to exercise his own judgment in choosing his own representative.
It provides simply that any person who is a member in good standing of
the bar of the highest court in any State will be eligible to represent
those who employ him before any Federal agency....5
Thus, the Agency Practice Act is described as a federal agency-wide
declaration of the principle that an attorney who is a member of the
bar of the highest court of his jurisdiction (or a duly licensed certified
public accountant in practice before the Internal Revenue Service) is,
by that fact, eligible to represent others before a federal agency with-
out requirements of admission. This principle is implemented by the
practitioner's own certification that he is duly qualified in his jurisdiction.
The client is assured that the attorney chosen to represent him before an
54 1968 Sec' TREAs. AN. REP. 78.
111 CONG. REc. 27193 (1965).
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agency will be dealt with in that manner by the agency. 6 Among other
things, the Act reserved to the agencies the authorization to discipline
practitioners who are adjudged guilty of misconduct in their practice
before the respective agencies. Hence, while the attorney is qualified
by virtue of his professional license to practice before all federal agen-
cies (with the exception of the Patent Office in patent matters), each
agency has retained the authority to provide for standards of conduct
of practice before it and also to provide for discipline of the practitioner
who has violated such standards of conduct. Nothing in the Agency
Practice Act prohibits an agency from setting up standards of admis-
sion for laymen, and, pursuant to the doctrine of Sperry v. Florida, a
state may not interfere with, nor attempt to regulate, a layman who has
been admitted to practice administratively before a federal agency.
The practical effect of the Agency Practice Act was to eliminate ad-
mission requirements for attorneys and certified public accountants to
practice before the Internal Revenue Service; to prohibit any federal
agency from establishing future requirements of admission for attorneys;
and to compel the agency to deal with the citizens' authorized represen-
tative. As stated previously, only four federal agencies, out of approxi-
mately forty, required formal admission to practice before them when
S. 1466 and S. 1758 were under consideration by the 88th and 89th
Congress. Of these, the Veterans' Administration and the Interstate
Commerce Commission simply required the filling out of a routine ad-
mission form. The Patent Office required examination of lawyers prior
to admission, but that office was eventually exempted from the provisions
of S. 1758. Only the Treasury Department retained an enrollment pro-
gram for attorneys requiring an application and some proof of good
character and reputation, at least insofar as the applicant's character and
reputation related to his tax practice before the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. The Treasury's admission or enrollment requirements extended only
to practice before the Internal Revenue Service. Other bureaus of
Treasury, such as Bureau of Customs, did not have requirements of en-
rollment.
As previously stated, Treasury's opposition to the legislation was
founded on the proposition that good standing of an attorney in the bar
of his state did not necessarily constitute proof of good character and
reputation for practice in tax matters before the highest administrative
level of the Internal Revenue Service. The proponents of the legisla-
-6 Hearings on S. 1758 at 120.
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tion insisted that it is the fundamental right of every individual to be
represented by counsel of his choice and that such counsel should -not
be burdened by the necessity of further qualifying himself with an adT
ministrative agency when he has already qualified as a member of the
bar of his jurisdiction. In the event he failed to qualify before the
agency, he was denied the opportunity to represent his client and the
client was denied his choice of counsel. This, in effect, amounted to
federal limitation on the choice of counsel, and in some respects was an
abrogation of the citizen's right to counsel. In reply to this argument,
the Treasury Department maintained that it should not be compelled
to recognize attorneys of questionable integrity or whose conduct in, tax
matters showed contempt of the federal tax system. Essentially, the*
federal tax system is a voluntary self-assessment system which depends.
on voluntary compliance with the tax laws. Hence, the Treasury in-
sisted upon unimpeachable character and good reputation in tax matters
for those attorneys who engage in tax practice before the agency.
Has the enactment of the Agency Practice Act impaired or improved.
the quality or integrity of representation before the agencies? Ther6,
is no way to ascertain any answer with certainty. The Treasury Depart-
ment, which vigorously opposed the legislation and failed to achieve the
exemption which it sought, has had the opportunity to review its positio'
in the light of experience under the Act. In a talk before the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants Committee on Professional
Ethics, two years after passage of the Act, the General Counsel of the
Treasury Department summed up the matter in this way:
I was one of those in the government who led the fight in opposition'
to the bill which eventually became the Agency Practice Act. We
opposed this bill solely out of our concern for the protection of the
taxpayers and for the protection of the revenue of the United States.
Nevertheless, the act was passed, and, upon reflection, I am satisfied
that we were wrong and the Congress was right in passing that act.57
Insofar as the principle and objective of the Agency Practice Act were
to guarantee to the citizen his choice of counsel-the proposition that
every citizen should have the lawyer of his choice-that objective cer-
tainly has been achieved. Whether the citizen receives skilled and honest
representation is another matter.
"57Remarks by Fred B. Smith, General Counsel, Treasury Department, National
Conference on Professional Ethics in Committee on Professional Ethics of the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York, N. Y. on October 16, 1967.
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